Abstract: This paper develops a model in which investors communicate before trading in a general equilibrium. Investors repeatedly communicate in a social network but have limited knowledge of the network structure and thus do not fully realize the consequences of their communication and belief updating. As a result, asset returns contain excess comovement and more concentrated factor structures than fundamental values do. The model generates testable empirical predictions that are consistent with the empirical literature on excess comovement in asset returns.
INTRODUCTION
Understanding how asset returns are correlated is important for asset pricing and portfolio management. An existing literature documents the existence of concentrated factor structures in asset or portfolio returns in several different markets. More precisely, a common factor explains the bulk of covariation in asset returns, and the first few principal components explain almost all covariance of returns.
1 Such lowdimensional factor structures underlie the empirical factor models of asset returns such as the Fama-French three-factor model for stock returns and the yield curve model with level and slope factors for the bond market.
Why do these factor structures exist? Despite efforts to explain factor structures theoretically, no consensus has yet been reached. One possibility is that similar factor structures exist in the fundamental values of assets and give rise to the factors in asset * The author is at the Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA. The author is grateful to an anonymous referee, the Editor (Peter Pope), Vikas Agarwal, Snehal Banerjee, Peter DeMarzo, Darrell Duffie, Paul Gao, Jayant Kale, Omesh Kini, Ilan Kremer, Lei Jiang, Reza Mahani, Stefan Nagel, Zhen Shi, Ken Singleton, Ilya Strebulaev, Yi Xue, Jeff Zwiebel, and seminar participants at the 2012 China International Conference on Finance, and Stanford University for helpful comments. (Paper received November 15, 2011; revised version accepted June 7, 2013). returns. The evidence suggests that this is not the case. A large literature documents the existence of excess comovement in asset returns above and beyond what can be explained by fundamental values. Fama and French (1995) document that there are factors in earnings of firms that can be linked to the market and SMB(smallminus-big) factors in stock returns, but these factors are weaker in their explanatory powers than those in stock returns. Rotemberg (1990, 1993) find excess comovement in commodity prices and stock prices that cannot be explained by changes in fundamental values and discount rates. Froot and Dabora (1999) show that twin stocks (such as Royal Dutch and Shell) comove more with the markets in which they are primarily traded, despite these stocks representing claims to the same underlying cash flow streams. Morck et al. (2000) document that there is more excess stock price comovement in poor countries than in rich countries. 2 In this work, I develop a model of investors' communication and trading in general equilibrium. Investors update their beliefs based on the information they learn from other investors in a social network. Each investor only has limited information about the structure of the network. Therefore, although investors know that asset values are correlated, they do not fully realize the consequences of repetitive communication and belief updating on asset prices. The model explains excess comovement in security prices beyond the correlation of fundamentals and provides a rationale for concentrated factor structures in asset returns.
To illustrate the main idea of the model, consider the following concrete example. Three investors, A, B and C, invest in two stocks X and Y, each currently priced at one dollar per share. The fundamental values of X and Y have a correlation coefficient 0.5. Suppose a piece of news arrives that should cause X's price to increase by 30 cents and Y's price to increase by 15 cents. Only A correctly infers the impact of the news on X's price and only B infers the impact of the news on Y's price. C relies on information from both A and B prior to trading. Therefore, C receives a message from A that the price of X will increase by 30 cents and a message from B that the price of Y will increase by 15 cents. Without knowing the exact source of the messages, and knowing that both messages are noisy, C forms his belief on asset prices using the correlation between values of X and Y. Assume that C believes A and B's messages are derived from two independent signals about the stock prices and the signals contain a noise term with the same variance as that of the fundamental values, then C's best estimate from a simple Bayesian calculation is that the price of X should go up by 27 cents and Y by 18 cents. As a result, C's beliefs about the two stock prices are more correlated than the fundamental stock values; this will be reflected in the returns of X and Y when C trades in the market. The key assumption here is that C receives correlated signals but believes these signals to be independent due to limited information about the social network. This assumption, combined with the fact that C uses his knowledge about the correlation between fundamental values to update his belief, leads to the excess correlation in returns of X and Y. The correlation between X and Y's returns 2 Another stream of research studies the comovement associated with market indices. Vijh (1994) and Barberis et al. (2005) document that the correlation of a stock return with the S&P 500 index return increases (decreases) when the stock is included in (deleted from) the index, controlling for changes in the firm's characteristics. Furthermore, the correlation of the return of an included (deleted) stock with the returns of stocks not in the index decreases (increases). Greenwood and Sosner (2007) find similar patterns for stock inclusion/deletion for the Nikkei 225 index. Greenwood (2008) find that overweighted stocks (relative to the value-based weights) in Nikkei 225 have high betas. will increase further if C transmits his belief to other investors and those investors make similar assumptions and computations as C does and also trade in the market.
In the general model, I assume agents communicate in a social network but have limited knowledge of the network's structure. In particular, the agents are only aware of the structure of their immediate neighbors in the social network. In each period, each agent receives a private signal about the innovations in the fundamental values of multiple assets. The agents then communicate and update beliefs for many rounds in order to obtain more accurate information.
3 After obtaining their individual final beliefs, the agents trade at the end of the period and the asset prices clear the markets in a competitive equilibrium.
The main result of the model is that the repeated communication procedure by investors leads to excess comovement and a concentrated factor structure in asset prices. As can be seen from the above example, the intuition for the main result is that the belief updating on correlated assets creates more correlation than that in the fundamentals. In each round of communication, agents update their beliefs on the value of each asset using information on other assets, knowing that asset values are correlated. However, unaware of the entire structure of the network, the agents could not fully realize the consequences of repeated communication.
The model also generates several testable empirical implications. Excess comovement in asset returns is positively related to the noisiness of investors' signals and the number of rounds investors communicate before trading, and negatively related to the number of market participants. These results are consistent with existing empirical evidence. For example, Morck et al. (2000) show that there is more excess comovement in stock prices in less developed countries than in more developed countries. Campbell et al. (2001) document a decreasing trend in excess comovement in stock prices.
Our paper is closely related to DeMarzo et al. (2003) , who propose a model of information exchange where agents have persuasion bias, i.e., they fail to account for repeated updating of information, and obtain a low dimensional structure of agents' opinions. Different from their paper, the excess comovement in my model arises from the correlated updating based on the correlation among fundamental values of different assets, rather than from an asymmetric listening structure among agents. Indeed, there is a symmetric listening structure among the agents in my basic model, and thus the specific form of listening structure per se does not contribute to the deviation of asset prices from the fundamental values. 4 There is a literature that addresses excess comovement from different angles. Barberis et al., (2005) discuss several behavioral explanations of the genesis of factors in asset returns, i.e., the category view, the habitat view, and the information diffusion view. Factors or comovement of stock prices may arise because investors group assets into categories and invest at the level of categories, or because investors choose to trade only a subset of all securities, or because information is incorporated into some stock 3 There is a literature on communication and social network (for example, see the references in DeMarzo et al., 2003) . Hong et al. (2005) present evidence that word-of-mouth transmission of information and ideas happens and money managers are more likely to buy/sell stocks that are bought/sold by other managers in the same city. Sabherwal et al. (2011) show that discussions on internet stock message boards can affect stock prices even when no fundamental news is present. prices faster than others due to market frictions. Several papers explain contagion in asset prices via different mechanisms, e.g., liquidity in Calvo (1999) , portfolio rebalancing in Kodres and Pritsker (2002) , and wealth effects in Kyle and Xiong (2001) . Veldkamp (2006) uses a market of information and endogenous production of information to explain comovement of asset prices. Mok et al. (1992) show that excess comovement can arise due to family control of different firms. My model is complementary to this strand of literature and offers a different mechanism that can generate excess comovement and factor structures in asset prices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model and defines the equilibrium. Section 3 presents the main results. Section 4 illustrates the main results through a simple two asset example of the model. Section 5 discusses several extensions of the basic model and their applications and empirical predictions. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains the proofs.
THE MODEL
In the model, economic activities occur in T periods, denoted by t = 1, 2, . . . , T . There are M agents in the economy, indexed by α ∈ {1, . . . , M }. The agents trade one riskless asset and N risky assets in the market, indexed by i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }. The riskless asset is completely elastic and risky asset i has constant per capita supply S i . Agent α maximizes a CARA expected utility function of terminal wealth W α T in period T :
Without loss of generality, the risk-free interest rate is set to zero. Risky asset i pays a single liquidating dividend V 
where the noises ε
(i) Communication and Beliefs
The agents trade at the end of each period t ∈ [1, T ]. Before trading, they communicate and gather information to form more accurate opinions about asset values. The agents communicate in a social network. Due to limitations such as locations, familiarity and trust, each agent only listens to a particular subset of other agents and learns of their private information. We define the listening set of agent α as the subset of agents that agent α listens to and denote it by L(α). We assume that α ∈ L(α) for all α, that is, each agent listens to himself or herself. We define the listening structure among 
where |L(α)| stands for the number of agents in L(α).
Consider next the general case where the fundamental values of assets are correlated, i.e.,
Since private information is noisy, the agent can improve the estimation of one asset's value using the information on other assets. The following proposition provides the Bayes updating formula of the agent's beliefs.
Proposition 1:
After the first round of communication, based on agent α's information set, a sufficient statistic for the innovation x i t in the fundamental value of asset i is given by:
where the matrix
is computed by first obtaining
where I N is the identity matrix of size N × N , and then normalizing rows ofÃ α so that each row sums to 1,
Intuitively, updating formula (3) means that agent α first averages the signals from all agents in his listening set on each individual asset, and then derives the sufficient statistic as a weighted average of the averaged signals on different assets using entries of the updating matrix A α as weights. The sufficient statistic y i,α t,1 will be referred to as agent α's belief about the innovation in asset i's value after the first round of communication.
The matrixÃ α gives the Bayesian updating weights and A α is a normalization ofÃ α so that the sum of weights for each asset is equal to one.
5 If the fundamental values x i t are uncorrelated cross-sectionally in i, i.e., X is diagonal, then A α = I N is the identity matrix, and (3) reduces to the uncorrelated updating formula (2).
In the second round of communication, agent β communicates his belief y i,β t,1 to all agents who listen to him. Each agent α then updates his belief to y i,α t,2 based on the new information received in this round (using the formula given below). This completes the second round of communication. In each period t, the communication among agents continues in this way and stops after K rounds, after which the agents trade with each other. 6 The following key assumption provides the updating formula of the agent's belief after each round of communication.
Assumption 1: After the k-th round of communication, agent α updates his belief using the following formula:
Equation (6) means that the agents apply the same formula they use in the first round of communication (equation (2)) to later rounds of communication. This assumption is made to capture the fact that each agent has only limited knowledge about the structure of the communication network. 7 In reality, an agent is only aware of his immediate neighbors, i.e., people in his listening set and people who listen to him. Starting from the second round of communication, the agents learn of beliefs that could contain information from agents not directly connected to them. Therefore, it is beyond their capacity to formulate a Bayesian updating formula after the second round of communication. Furthermore, in reality, when an investor receives a piece 5 Such a normalization is warranted to the extent that agents communicate their beliefs, which are sufficient statistics of their information, rather than the posteriors. Investors can ignore priors of asset values when they communicate since priors are common knowledge in the model. 6 The number of rounds K can be regarded as exogeneously determined by the investors. K may be viewed as the number of communication rounds with which the agents believe that they would have obtained information of sufficient precision for trading purposes. 7 If the network is symmetric and the asset fundamentals are uncorrelated, then the formula in Assumption 1 would provide an unbiased estimate of the true fundamental values and the resulting asset prices aggregates information correctly. of information from another investor, it may be difficult to know even the number of rounds of communication this piece of information has experienced. Assumption 1 simplifies the problem faced by the agents with limited knowledge. Equation (6) is easy to implement as it allows the investors to compute a weighted average of the information they receive at any point of time, using time-invariant weights that only require knowledge of their listening set. 8 Next I turn to the specification of the social network among agents.
Definition 1: A listening structure is said to be symmetric of degree M 1 if there exists a constant M 1 such that:
In a symmetric listening structure of degree M 1 , each agent listens to M 1 agents and is also listened to by exactly M 1 agents. In such a network, each agent has the same influence on the average belief of all agents and thus information is aggregated without "biases". As the focus of this paper is on the consequences of communication with limited knowledge (Assumption 1), rather than on the structure of the social network, I make the following assumption on the listening structure. More general structures of the communication network will be discussed in Section 5.(ii).
Assumption 2:
The listening structure among agents is symmetric of degree M 1 .
In rational expectations equilibria, agents observe prices and make inferences based on them. As we will show later, the equilibrium prices aggregate the investors' beliefs in a certain way. Therefore, in order to define expectations and optimal portfolio choices, we need to make assumptions about agents' beliefs about the average belief of all agents. Denote the average belief of investors for asset i after k rounds of communication byȳ
I make the following assumption about agent α's belief about the average belief of investors after communication. 8 In general, even if the agents are aware of the structure of the entire communication network, the Bayesian updating formulas can quickly become very complicated as the number of rounds increases. Thus Assumption 1 can also be understood as a simplified formula that allows agents with limited processing power to update the information they receive.
This assumption means that the agents believe the average belief of all investors after K rounds of communication correctly aggregate information from all investors. The agents' beliefs in this assumption are correct if the social network is symmetric and the asset fundamentals are uncorrelated.
(ii) Equilibrium
) be agent α's positions in the risky assets after trading in period t. I define the equilibrium of the model in the spirit of the sequential equilibrium as in Kreps and Wilson (1982) .
Definition 2:
An equilibrium of the model is defined to be a set of prices {P t } 1≤t≤T −1 and a collection of portfolio choices {θ α t } 1≤α≤N ,1≤t≤T −1 of agents such that : 1) Portfolio choices of each agent optimizes expected utility,
denotes the expectation under agent α's belief, conditional on the information set I α t after the communication stage and the price P t in period t.
2) The financial markets clear, i.e.,
where S = (S 1 , . . . , S N ) is the vector of (constant) per capita supply of assets.
Note that the agents learn from the equilibrium prices when making optimal portfolio choices, thus the equilibrium is similar to the standard rational expectations equilibrium as in Radner (1979) .
The following theorem proves the existence of an equilibrium and characterizes the equilibrium prices of the model.
Theorem 2:
There exists an equilibrium in which the price vectors {P t } 1≤t≤T −1 are given by
is the average belief vector of all agents after the communication stage in period s , and S is the per capita supply vector.
The first term in equation (10) is the expectation of fundamentals based on the average belief of investors (the matrixÃ is the projection matrix of the vector of fundamental values X s on the average belief vectorȲ s,K , as in linear regressions). The second term is the compensation for risk in X s for s > t, and the third term is the YANG compensation for residual risk due to the non-fully-revealing nature of prices (the price in period t only revealsȲ t,K , but not X t ).
In the equilibrium, the individual investors form their portfolios with information from market price. As a result, the resulting portfolio for each investor is the same. This fact is reminiscent of the "no trade" theorem Milgrom and Stokey (1982) where agents do not trade in rational equilibrium but the prices still reflect their information. Note also that our model is not a model with heterogeneous beliefs but rather a model with heterogeneous information (and limited knowledge about the social network), hence the information from prices is sufficient to ensure that all individuals hold the same portfolio. Nevertheless, the agents' limited knowledge about the social network prevents information from aggregating in an unbiased way.
As in classical rational expectations equilibria, we do not model the price formation process. It is possible to extend the model to allow for noise traders (as in, for example, Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) , which would provide an explicit process of price formation through trades. We leave this possibility for future research.
Denote the change in prices for asset i from period t − 1 to t by R i t , that is,
We will refer to the changes in asset prices as asset returns throughout this paper. 9 Let R t = (R 1 t , . . . R N t ) be the vector of returns of risky assets. By Theorem 2, asset returns in the equilibrium are given by
RETURN COMOVEMENT AND FACTOR STRUCTURES
As discussed in the introduction, there is excess comovement in asset returns beyond those in fundamental values of assets. Furthermore, a typical feature of the comovement of asset returns is that the first few principal components explain almost all of the variations in asset returns. In other words, there is a factor structure in returns. In the following, I will establish the connection between the asset return comovement and the covariance of investors' beliefs and use this connection to explain the above stylized facts about asset returns. Using equation (12), the covariance of asset returns in the model is given by
When the number of agents M is large, the matrixÃ = X ( X + σ 2 ε M I N ) −1 is close to the identity matrix. Studying the covariance of asset returns is thus essentially equivalent to studying the covariance of beliefs of investors after communication.
As the listening structure is symmetric with degree M 1 , we can rewrite the updating formula (6) as:
where A 1 is obtained by normalizingÃ 1
I N ) so that each row sums to 1. Summing both sides of (14) with respect to α, and using the fact that the listening structure is symmetric, we obtain the following simple updating formula for the average beliefs of investors after k communication rounds,
Rewritten in vector form,Ȳ
Iterated application of 16 yieldsȲ
Plugging equation (17) into (13), one obtains the following representation of the covariance matrix of returns,
Studying the covariance of returns is thus equivalent to studying the matrix on the right hand side of equation (18). The eigenvalues and principal components of this matrix are much easier to analyze if the symmetric matrices A 1 and X commute, that is, A 1 X = X A 1 . The following assumption on the covariance matrix of the changes in asset fundamentals is a sufficient condition that A 1 and X commute.
Assumption 4:
1) The covariance matrix X has distinct eigenvalues. 2) The vector 1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1) is the eigenvector of X with the largest eigenvalue.
The assumption that X has distinct eigenvalues is a generic assumption, that is, the assumption is true except for a zero measure set of symmetric matrices, because the subset of symmetric matrices for which at least two eigenvalues are equal is a lower-dimensional subset of the set of all symmetric matrices. The second part of the assumption states that the market factor is the first principal component of the changes in asset fundamentals. This is consistent with the empirical evidence that there is a strong market factor among unexpected changes in earnings (Fama and French, 1995.) 10 The following lemma is useful for our main results later.
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Lemma 1: If Assumption 4 is true, then the matrices A 1 and X commute, i.e., A 1 X = X A 1 . Let ρ i be the i-th largest eigenvalue of X , then ρ i is the eigenvalue of the i-th principal component for X . The following theorem characterizes the eigenvalues of the covariance matrix of returns after communication.
Theorem 3:
The i-th largest eigenvalue of the covariance matrix of returns in period t (1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1) is given by:
For any i < j , as the the number of communication rounds K goes to infinity,
Equation (19) relates the eigenvalues of the covariance matrix of returns to those of the covariance matrix of fundamental values. Intuitively, equation (20) means that the relative difference between the importance of any two principal components increases unboundedly as the number of communication rounds increases. With a sufficient number of communication rounds, the covariance matrix of returns becomes very concentrated in the sense that the relative differences between two adjacent eigenvalues are arbitrarily large. Therefore, the covariance of asset returns is mostly explained by the first few principal components or factors, consistent with empirical evidence found in many asset markets.
I define excess comovement in the model as follows.
Definition 3:
The asset returns are said to have excess comovement if for any 1 ≤ i < j ≤ N , the ratio of eigenvalues of the covariance matrix of returns
is greater than the corresponding ratio of eigenvalues of the covariance matrix of fundamental values
This definition captures the main intuition of excess comovement, that is, the first few principal factors in returns explain more covariance than that explained by factors in the covariance of fundamental values. The following corollary follows easily from Theorem 3.
Corollary 4:
There is excess comovement in asset returns. The covariance matrix of returns becomes more concentrated as the number of communication rounds increases. The extent of excess comovement and concentration of factor structure is positively correlated with σ ε , the standard deviation of the noise term of agents' signals, and K , the number of communication rounds, and negatively correlated with M 1 , the number of agents in any listening set, and M , the total number of agents.
This corollary has interesting empirical implications. For example, the more noisy investors' signals are, or the fewer information sources investors have, or the lower the number of market participants, the more excess comovement there is in returns. These are consistent with the evidence in Morck et al. (2000) , that there is more excess comovement in stock prices in less developed countries than more developed countries, and the evidence in Campbell et al. (2001) , that there has been more excess comovement in stock prices in the past than in the present.
It is less direct to explain the empirical implication on the number of communication rounds, because a priori we do not have predictions about whether agents communicate for more rounds in more developed markets or in less developed markets. However, we should keep in mind that the number of communication rounds is not completely exogeneous; rather, it is determined by agents by necessity. It is reasonable to assume that the more noisy agents' signals are, the more rounds they will communicate before trading. Therefore, the comparative static results on the number of communication rounds should be of the same sign with those on noisiness of signals, and that is consistent with Corollary 4.
Corollary 5:
The largest eigenvalue of the covariance matrix of returns is
, and 1 is the first principal component of the covariance matrix of returns.
Corollary 5 and Theorem 3 imply that if the market factor is the largest factor in the fundamental values of assets, then the market factor is also the largest factor in returns.
AN EXAMPLE WITH TWO ASSETS
In this section, I illustrate the model with a concrete example. Consider an economy with two assets. In this section, the subscript t is suppressed because the results are independent of the time period. The changes in fundamental values of the assets are given by X = (x 1 , x 2 ). X ∼ N (0, X ) with
So the correlation between the fundamental values between the two stocks is 0.2. There is a large number M of agents. Agent α receives initial signals:
where ε i,α are i.i.d ∼ N (0, 1). Assume that the listening structure among agents is symmetric of degree M 1 , that is, each agent listens to himself and another M 1 − 1 agent, and is listened to by M 1 − 1 agents other than himself. In this example, M 1 = 2, therefore each agent α listens to himself and exactly one other agent α .
The updating matrix A 1 is obtained by computing: The covariance matrix of returns are given by:
Panel B. Eigenvalues of Return Covariance
If we assume the number of agents M is very large, as in the real financial market, then
, and the covariance of returns is approximately equal to the covariance of average beliefs of agents after K communication rounds, Table 1 gives the covariance and correlation matrices of returns for several instances of K . The table shows clearly that the correlation structure becomes more concentrated with more rounds of communications. Panel B of Table 1 reports the eigenvalues for the principal components(PCs) of returns and the percent of variance explained by each PC. The gaps between the eigenvalues widen with each round of updating. After 10 rounds of updating, the first PC, which is the market factor here, already explains over 95% of the variation of returns and the asset returns exhibit a very concentrated factor structure.
EXTENSIONS AND APPLICATIONS

(i) Sophisticated Agents
In the basic model, all investors exhibit the same behavioral pattern when they update beliefs. In reality, some investors could have more knowledge about the structure of the social network than other investors. In this section, I consider a model with two classes of agents: naive and sophisticated. Naive agents behave the same way as the agents in the basic model. Sophisticated agents have some knowledge about the network structure and exploit this knowledge in trading. Specifically, a sophisticated agent only uses the updating matrix A 1 in the first round of communication, and simply averages signals from agents in his listening set in later communication rounds.
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The main result is that the concentration of correlation of asset returns, still exists, but is attenuated when there are sophisticated agents. Formally, assume there is a fraction μ of naive agents, who follow the updating rule (6), and 1 − μ of sophisticated agents, who follow (6) in the first round (k = 1), and use the following updating formula in the k-th round (k > 1),
, for all i.
In addition, assume that the listening structure is also symmetric with respect to the two types of agents in the following sense,
In other words, each agent α's listening set contains a fraction of naive agents as in the overall population. Summing the updating equations (6) and (22) across all agents, we have:
From this one can derive similar results as in Theorem 3. One can also easily show that when there are more sophisticated agents in the economy, then there will be less excess comovement of asset prices. The intuition is that the updating matrix μA 1 + (1 − μ)I N leads to less comovement than the matrix A 1 in the case where all agents are naive. Morck et al. (2000) find that there is more excess comovement in the stock markets in poor countries than in rich countries. This is consistent with our model as people in more developed countries and more mature markets are more sophisticated than those in less developed countries and less mature markets. This result is also consistent with the time-series evidence that US stock returns are becoming less correlated in the long-run, shown in Campbell et al. (2001) , as investors in the modern era become more sophisticated than market participants in the past.
(ii) General Listening Structures
The listening structure among agents in the basic model is assumed to be symmetric. This assumption ignores the possibility that more knowledgeable or more authoritative people tend to be listened to by a greater number of people. However, there can be different hierarchies of agents in the market, and we may regard agents in the same hierarchy as having a roughly symmetric listening structure. Agents in a lower hierarchy listen more intensively to those in a higher hierarchy. In fact, stock prices are largely determined by the opinions of people in the highest hierarchies, such as stock analysts, fund managers, or economists. If agents in each hierarchy behave similarly to the basic model, similar results on the excess comovement of asset returns to those in the basic model then hold.
Another generalization is the possibility that agents only communicate within groups divided by their location or other characteristics, and the agents in a particular group mostly communicate about the assets for which they have better information, such as stocks that are traded in their local markets. The segmentation of communication among agents can be used to explain the segmentation of markets and the "home bias" of investors. For example the fact that the price of each of a pair of twin stocks comoves more with the stock prices in the local stock market, as documented in Froot and Dabora (1999) .
(iii) Feedback Effects
In the basic model it is assumed that investors know the true distribution of fundamental values of assets. However, if the fundamental values are not observable, investors may use the covariance of observed stock returns as a proxy for the covariance of fundamental stock values. Because stock returns are shown in the basic model to possess excess comovement relative to fundamental values, the above practice will generate a feedback effect and will further increase the excess comovement of stock returns. Therefore, the realized excess comovement of asset returns can be more severe than those predicted in the basic model.
In fact, in such a model, if investors update their beliefs on the covariance matrix dynamically, then covariance of stock returns will finally concentrate to such an extent that the market factor is the only determining factor of stock returns; in other words, a one-factor model fits asset returns perfectly. In reality, there are certain forces that prevent the ever-intensifying concentration depicted above, e.g., partial observability of the fundamental values. As a result, we do not observe a single market factor explaining the entire covariance structure.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I develop a general equilibrium model in which investors communicate in a social network before trading. Investors repeatedly communicate in the network but their knowledge of the social network is limited to that of their neighbors. Therefore, investors do not fully realize the consequences of their communication and belief updating. As a result, asset returns contain excess comovement and more concentrated factor structures compared to fundamental values. The model generates several testable empirical predictions that are consistent with the empirical literature on excess return comovement.
There are potential research directions that extend the current model. For example, factors may arise not only from fundamental values, but also from other investor behaviors (e.g., Barberis and Shleifer, 2003) . The model may be extended to the case where both fundamental factors and behavioral factors exist and they can all lead excess comovement through the communication channel modeled here. Another possible extension is to consider more general listening structures such as relatively isolated communication networks in order to explain phenomena such as "home bias" or slow diffusion of information across different investor groups. 
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1: Recall that
By assumptions of the model, 
Define the matrix A α by normalizing rows ofÃ α so that each row sums to 1,
From (A5), 
The market clearing condition is clearly satisfied with the portfolio choices given by (A8). We will show that investors optimize their portfolio choices in (A8) given the prices (A7) by backward induction, starting with period T − 1.
Step 1 
Equations (A24) and (A25) imply that the sum of each row ofÃ 1 is equal to
Lemma 2 implies that the updating matrix A 1 is given by:
